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Abstract. Humans cooperate a great deal in economic activity, but our two major models
of equilibrium – Walrasian competitive in markets and Nash in games – portray us as
only non-cooperative.

In earlier work, I have proposed a model of cooperative decision

making (Kantian optimization); here, I embed Kantian optimization in generalequilibrium models and show that ‘Walras-Kant’ equilibria exist and often resolve
inefficiencies associated with income taxation, public goods and bads, and non-traditional
firm ownership, which typically plague models where agents are Nash optimizers.

In

four examples, introducing Kantian optimization in one market – often the labor market –
suffices to internalize externalities, generating Pareto efficient equilibria in their
presence. The scope for efficient decentralization via markets appears to be significantly
broadened with cooperative behavior.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory has studied par excellence how economic agents compete with
each other, the two magisterial models being general-equilibrium theory and game
theory.

However, what distinguishes our species’ economic behavior from that of the

other great apes is our ability to cooperate with each other. A series of recent books, by
economists, anthropologists, and evolutionary psychologists focus upon our cooperative
abilities ( Bowles and Gintis [2011], Tomasello [2014, 2016], Henrich and Henrich
[2007]). It is a serious lacuna in our economic modeling not to have attempted to
introduce a model of cooperation at the level of abstraction of Nash equilibrium into
general-equilibrium theory, to rectify the one-sided view of economic decision-making
that Nash equilibrium represents.
In recent work, I (2010, 2015) have proposed how cooperation of economic
agents can be formalized as a mathematical first cousin of Nash optimization, a protocol
I’ve called Kantian optimization.

In a variety of non-market games, Kantian

optimization delivers equilibrium allocations that are Pareto efficient when Nash
optimization fails to do so.

In the present paper, I insert Kantian optimization into

Arrow-Debreu general-equilibrium models of market economies, and show that the same
result holds. To wit, if there is Kantian optimization in a single market (usually the
labor market), this suffices to resolve a number of classical inefficiencies, dubbed
‘market failures.’ Examples presented below show that Kantian optimization delivers
decentralized, Pareto efficient allocations when there are public and private goods; that it
can eliminate the dead-weight loss of income taxation; that it provides a decentralized,
efficient solution to the problem of global carbon emissions; and that it gives Pareto
efficient equilibria in an economy with worker-owned firms. In most of these cases,
there are degrees of freedom in the equilibrium income distribution that can be
exogenously chosen, while preserving Pareto efficiency. Thus, in a word, cooperative
economic behavior, modeled as Kantian optimization, enables us to separate efficiency
from distributional considerations.
The notable advantage of the Kantian approach is that it does not rely on the
ubiquitous practice of behavioral economics (to date) in explaining cooperative behavior,
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which is to insert ‘exotic’ arguments into preferences – arguments like altruism, or a
warm glow, or a preference for equality or fairness – and then to derive the cooperative
solution as a Nash equilibrium of the game with altered preferences.

Granted, a moral

view motivates Kantian optimization, but that morality is captured in how people
optimize, rather than by amending their preferences.

I claim that to get the ‘right

equilibrium’ using the technique of inserting exotic arguments into preferences usually
requires that the modeler know what the cooperative equilibrium is ex ante – then
preferences can be constructed (reverse engineering) so that the Nash equilibrium of the
game with the altered preferences is the desired (cooperative) strategy profile. But in
many cases – including all the cases I study below—it is not obvious what the
cooperative (i.e., Pareto efficient) equilibrium is, ex ante, and so this technique cannot be
used. Do we know what the frontier of Pareto efficient allocations in the problem of
global emissions is? In the absence of knowledge of all the information about
preferences and technologies, I assert we do not: but the Kantian model I propose below
finds a point -- in fact a multi-dimensional manifold of such points -- on this frontier in
a decentralized manner.

In the models below preferences are classical and self-

interested, containing only traditional (non-exotic) arguments. Parsimony in modeling
preferences is achieved by varying the optimization protocol.
Indeed, these results suggest that our nomenclature of ‘market failures’ may be
off-base: for the efficiency results I demonstrate are all achieved in market economies.
The failure of efficiency appears to be due, not to the market as such, but to Nash
optimization.
In the next section, I review the definition of three kinds of Kantian optimization
in games, and their moral motivation. Section 3 presents a model of greenhouse gas
emissions by a set of countries, where Pareto efficient equilibrium allocations exist, and
the income distribution among m countries at equilibrium has

degrees of freedom.

Section 4 decentralizes the efficient allocation of a public and private good in a semimarket economy. Section 5 presents a model of market socialism, where Pareto efficient
Walras-Kant equilibria exist at almost any degree of income equality. Section 6 presents
a model of worker-owned firms, where production involves labor in m occupations, and
there are Pareto efficient equilibria with

degrees of freedom in the income
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distribution. Section 7 concludes by briefly addressing the skepticism that many will
have with regard to the realism of Kantian optimization as a human behavioral protocol.
An appendix presents the proofs of the existence theorems.
I do not present the most general model in each of the four substantive cases I
discuss: on the contrary, I try to present the simplest models that make the point, so as not
to distract the reader with complexity that would render less transparent the central
arguments. The third substantive model, in section 5, is presented in most detail.
2. Kantian equilibrium in games 1
We consider games in normal form among n players, whose payoff functions are
denoted

, where the strategy spaces

are intervals of non-

negative real numbers. Strategies will be usually denoted
denoted E; for any vector
derivative of any function f by

Definition 1 A game

, denote

; a strategy profile is
. Denote the

partial

.

is strictly monotone decreasing (increasing) if the

payoff of each player is strictly decreasing (increasing) in the strategies of the other
players. A game is strictly monotone if it is either strictly monotone increasing or
decreasing.
Consider, first, symmetric games. It will suffice, for our purposes here, to
consider symmetric games where the payoff function of player i is

, for

some function V. The supposition that the game is of this form is that all players ‘are in
the same boat,’ and being in the same boat induces a kind of solidarity, which suggests
the question “What is the strategy I’d like all of us to play?” In this case, each player
chooses the strategy that maximizes

. Clearly players unanimously agree on

the answer. This motivates:

1

This section reviews material presented in Roemer (2010, 2015, in press).
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Definition 2 A simple Kantian equilibrium is a strategy

such that:
.

(2.1)

Typically, simple Kantian equilibria do not exist. However, if the game is symmetric,
they do.

More generally, they exist if the game has a ‘common diagonal’: that is, if

every player orders the strategy profiles associated with the ‘main diagonal’ of the payoff
matrix in the same way.
It is noteworthy that solidarity is defined (in the American Heritage Dictionary) as
as ‘a union of purpose, sympathies, or interests among the members of a group.’ This is
most easily interpreted as a symmetric game.

Thus, solidarity is not the characterization

of the actions that the members of the group take (e.g., a simple Kantian equilibrium),
but rather of the state of the world that places them ‘in the same boat.’ I am suggesting
that the Kantian question proposed in the last paragraph is induced by the commonality of
the members’ interests 2.
The aphorism that summarizes this kind of thinking is “either we all hang
together, or we each hang separately,” a phrase first uttered by Benjamin Franklin at the
signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776.

Franklin was urging his co-signers

not to reason according to the Nash protocol, which would have produced too many free
riders – too few signers of the Declaration.
The nomenclature ‘Kantian equilibrium’ is borrowed, with some apology, from
Kant’s categorical imperative: that morality requires taking that action that one would
wish be universalized.
When games are not symmetric, simple Kantian equilibria rarely exist.

We

generalize in two ways. Imagine, now, a game with heterogeneous preferences
suppose the existing strategy profile is

and

. Agent 1 is considering

increasing his effort by 10%. But he understands that there are externalities to the choice
of effort levels, and he asks, “How would I like it if everyone increased his effort by
10%?” If there are negative externalities (a monotone decreasing game), then he might
2

That humans, and not chimpanzees, have the capacity to think this way is certainly
related to what Tomasello calls our ability to conceptualize ‘joint intentionality.’
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well answer that he would dislike this change (unlike a Nash optimizer who might find
increasing only his own effort by 10% attractive). This motivates the definition:

Definition 3

is a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium if no player would

prefer to re-scale the entire vector by any non-negative scalar. That is:
.

(2.2)

To be precise, for agent i, the domain of r in the ‘argmax’ function is bounded by the
requirement that

. It is not necessary, however, that

for

.3

In other words, a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium is a stable point with respect
to optimization protocol “change my effort by a factor r only if I would prefer the
strategy profile where everyone changes his effort by the factor r.” The first-cousin
relationship to Nash equilibrium is evident – players evaluate the counterfactual using
their own preferences, and need not know the preferences of others.
The motivation here is, again, a kind of solidarity. By contemplating the effect of
a general re-scaling of the strategy profile, the agent is forced to consider the externalities
others impose on him. He is not an altruist – that is, the protocol does not force him to
consider the externalities his behavior has for others. But, indeed, it turns out that the
internalization of externalities that this kind of Kantian reasoning induces suffices, in
many cases, to resolve inefficiencies characteristic of Nash equilibrium. (When a small
child throws her candy wrapper on the sidewalk, the parent may say “How would you
like it if everyone threw his candy wrapper on the sidewalk?” This query assumes or
encourages a Kantian morality in the child. In contrast, exploiting altruism, the parent
would say, “How do you think others feel when you throw your candy wrapper….” The
altruistic approach may be ineffective, if the child understands that her candy wrapper has
a miniscule effect on the environment.)

3

To be still more precise, the domain condition on r when considering agent i is that
and
defines a payoff for i. In all the games in this paper, it’s in

fact the case that
-- that is, the payoff depends on one’s own
contribution and the total contribution – and there is a given domain Di for the function
. The proper domain specification for r in (2.2) is
.
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Re-scaling the strategy profile is only one kind of symmetric change in the
profile. Another kind of counterfactual an agent could consider is translating the strategy
profile by a constant. This induces another kind of Kantian equilibrium:

Definition 4

is an additive Kantian equilibrium if no player would prefer to

translate the entire vector by any scalar; that is:
.

(2.3)

The sense in which Kantian optimization models cooperation is suggested by:
Proposition 14 If the game

is a strictly monotone game, then any simple or

additive Kantian equilibrium is Pareto efficient in the game, and any positive
multiplicative Kantian equilibrium is Pareto efficient in the game.
Thus, Kantian optimization resolves tragedies of the commons (monotone
decreasing games) and the inefficiency of public-good provision/ free rider problems
(monotone increasing games).

An example
Consider a fishing economy where the fishers have utility functions
where x is fish consumed and E is efficiency units of labor expended fishing. The
production function of the lake where people fish is

, G increasing and

concave. The allocation rule is ‘each keeps his catch,’ so (apart from noise) the
allocation of fish at an effort vector is proportional to effort:
.
This induces a game defined by:
.
If G is strictly concave, this is a monotone decreasing game.

Proposition 1 tells us that

any multiplicative Kantian equilibrium is Pareto efficient in the game. But something
4

Roemer (in press, chapters 2 and 3).
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stronger is true: such an equilibrium is also Pareto efficient in the economy. To see this,
we write the characterizing condition for a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium in the
differentiable case:

For all i

.

(2.4)

Expanding this expression, and assuming all efforts are positive, yields:
for all i

,

which is just the statement that the marginal rates of substitution of all agents between
labor and consumption equal the marginal rate of transformation, the condition for Pareto
efficiency in the economy.
In other words, efficiency in the game means that, among all allocations
achievable according to the ‘each-keeps-his-catch’ rule, the Kantian equilibrium is
efficient. Efficiency in the economy means that there is no other feasible allocation,
under any rule, that Pareto dominates the Kantian equilibrium of the game. 
Mathematically, we can contrast Nash (non-cooperative) behavior with Kantian
(cooperative) behavior in this way. At a given strategy profile

, each Nash

optimizer contemplates changing the strategy profile by varying his own dimension only
of the profile E. Thus the n counterfactual strategy profiles are chosen from different
unidimensional line segments of the profile space

. However, in Kantian

optimization, all players contemplate deviating within the same unidimensional line
segment of the profile space – in the case of multiplicative Kantian along the ray through
the profile E, and in additive Kantian, along the 45 degree line (in the two player case) in
the profile space containing E. Restricting individual deviations to a common space of
strategy profiles is the mathematical representation of cooperation.
There are many other ‘Kantian variations’ besides the additive and multiplicative
ones (see Roemer[2015]), but they will not be needed in the present analysis.
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I do not claim that Kantian optimization is rational in one-shot games. What I
argue is that in many situations, the same players counteract with each other all the time,
and a morality of solidarity may develop that induces players to optimize in the Kantian
manner, if they come to feel a sense of solidarity.

It is not my task here to show how

this emerges; rather, I want to show that if Kantian optimization is a moral protocol in a
population, then many inefficiencies in market economies can be resolved. I suggest
readers think of Kantian optimization as a moral code. In the last section of the paper, I
address the accessibility of Kantian reasoning to human beings in somewhat more detail.
I amplify on my remark about behavioral economics in the Introduction. An
experimenter observes in the lab that subjects do not play what the experimenter believes
is the Nash equilibrium of the game (think of trust games, public-good games, the
ultimatum and dictator games). So the experimenter looks for ‘exotic’ preferences,
which would, if held by the subjects, produce the observed outcome as a Nash
equilibrium. This is done by inserting arguments like altruism, a concern for fairness, a
concern for equality, etc., as arguments of preferences.

In contrast, my approach is to

keep preferences classical, but to alter the way that agents optimize.
I believe my approach is superior, because it decentralizes the cooperative
solution even when it is not obvious what that solution is.

Contrast this with the lab

games that I listed above: in all those cases, we can immediately see what the cooperative
solution is, and so it is not so hard to design preferences that will make that solution a
Nash equilibrium of the game so defined. But in many cases, the cooperative solution is
not obvious. Take the fishing example above: it is far from obvious what the Pareto
efficient allocation in which each keeps his catch is. (Under general conditions of
convexity, such an allocation exists, and is locally unique: see Roemer and Silvestre
[1993].) But the multiplicative Kantian equilibrium locates it without resorting to
inventing new preferences for the players. How would you go about assigning new
preferences to the fishers so that the Nash equilibrium of the new game is the Pareto
efficient allocation in which each keeps his catch? In other work, I have shown there is
no natural way to do this (Roemer [in press]).
To reiterate: my earlier papers on Kantian equilibrium have investigated its ability
to resolve inefficiencies in non-market games, or in very simple market games. The
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contribution of the present paper is to embed Kantian optimization in general-equilibrium
market economies, and to show how it can resolve inefficiencies there that are prevalent
with Nash optimization.

3. A model of global carbon emissions
Country i operates a single firm, whose production function is

where

K is capital and E is carbon emissions. All firms produce a single consumption good,
called x. (We could generalize and have many goods, but that is just a distraction.)
Labor is implicit. Capital is purchased on an international capital market, but labor is
immobile: hence, the entire labor supply of country i works in the firm of the country.
We therefore do not display explicitly the dependence of the technology on labor, nor do
we display labor in the utility function of each country.
There is a representative agent in each country, with utility function
where

,

is the global emissions. Utility is increasing in x and decreasing in

. We assume that these agents care about the future citizens of their country, and they
have internalized this in their preferences through the dependence of utility on global
emissions.
. It is easiest to assume that capital does

Country i has a capital endowment of
not depreciate.

(It also has a labor endowment, but as I remarked, we need not display

that explicitly.)
An allocation

is feasible if:
.

By standard methods, one shows the following:

Fact. An interior allocation is Pareto efficient if and only if:

(i) for all i,j
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(ii) for all i,

,

(3.1)

as well as the material balance conditions. Thus, efficiency requires equalization across
countries of both marginal products, and a Samuelson condition relating the marginal
product of emissions to the marginal rates of substitution.
There are three prices,
respectively.

for the good, capital, and a unit of emissions,

Each firm will maximize profits, which are given by

if the firm ‘demands 5’

Of course, profits include neoclassical profits and labor

income. We need not distinguish between these, since workers in each country offer
their labor inelastically to the firm, and all profits net of capital costs and emissions
payments redound to the citizenry.
Capital will be supplied on the global market by the citizenry that owns it.
The citizenry of each country must ‘supply’ the universe of firms with emissions.
It is the determination of the global emission supply that is unconventional.
A firm will pay

into a global fund if it emits

, and these revenues will be

distributed to the global citizenry, according to a share vector

, non-negative

and summing to one, which emerges endogenously as part of the equilibrium. Thus the
income of country i from this demogrant will be

, while the country’s firm pays

into the fund.
Consider the following game whose n players are the citizenries of each country
(i.e., the n representative agents). The strategy space for each player is
capital and emissions demand by its firm

. Given a

, prices, and a vector

the payoff function for player i is:
,
where

5

(3.2)

is a proposal, by county i, for global emissions.

To say the firm ‘demands’ emissions
carbon.

means it proposes to emit that many tons of
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Note the first argument in u is the amount of the good that country i can purchase
given its income, which comes from three sources – its capital income, its profit income,
and its demogrant.
Note that a simple Kantian equilibrium for
number

such that, for all i,

maximizes

is a
.

The ethical appeal of the simple Kantian equilibrium of the game defined, if it
exists, is that it is a unanimous decision of the global level of the public bad, which
maximizes the utility of countries, subject to the existence of a feasible share rule for
allocating the sum total of emissions taxes.

Definition 5. A global Walras-Kant equilibrium with emissions is a price vector
and a share vector

,summing to one, demands for capital and emissions

by each firm
global emissions

, a vector of consumptions

, and a total supply of

, such that:

•

For each i,

•

The number

is a simple Kantian equilibrium of the game V defined in

(3.2), given prices,

,

and

. Countries

unanimously agree on the global emissions supply.

•

•

for all i,

)

,

, and

.

Note, especially, that there are no ex ante limits on emissions, and no ex ante allocation
of emissions credits to countries. So these two contentious problems in the discussion of
global emissions’ control are solved by the use of Kantian optimization – that is to say,
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by cooperation in the choice of emission ‘supplies.’ The citizens supply the permission
to the countries in toto to emit. The agreement among countries specifies that firms may
not emit until it is verified that total emissions will be no greater (in fact equal to) the
citizenry-determined total supply of emissions.

Proposition 2 Any global W-K equilibrium with global emissions is Pareto efficient.

Proof:
1.

By profit-maximization, we have:

.

(3.3)

2. It follows from the Fact (3.1) characterizing Pareto efficiency that condition (i) holds.
What remains to prove for condition (ii) is that
.
3. A simple Kantian equilibrium of the game V, satsifies

.

(3.4)

Compute this says:
for all i

,

which reduces to:
for all i

.

(3.5)

Summing the last equations over i proves the claim, by step 2. 
I demonstrate existence under an assumption that is simplifying but probably not
necessary:
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Assumption QL. All the utility functions are quasi-linear of the form
and

satisfies the Inada conditions.

Nevertheless, the Assumption QL is perhaps not a bad one since the agents are countries:
it says countries wish to maximize GDP minus the costs of global warming.

Proposition 3 Under Assumption QL, and standard concavity assumptions on the
functions

including Inada conditions, a Walras-Kant equilibrium with global

emissions exists.
Proof: See Appendix, Parts A and B.

Remark. Without the assumption of quasi-linearity, the determination of the
, in step 2 of the above proof, is not so easy.
I have stated the ethical appeal of the simple Kantian equilibrium for global
emissions. It is this appeal that would motivate countries to agree to this procedure.
Now the income allocation, which is locally unique and that emerges from this
equilibrium, may not be so desirable. This can be amended by adding fixed transfers to
the incomes of all countries, which sum zero. These transfers will not alter the
analysis. Thus, we have an

manifold of efficient equilibria. Of course, there will

be a political problem in agreeing upon what the transfers will be.
This equilibrium concept decentralizes the problem. There is no need for a
centralized decision on the allocation of permits. The scheme is reminiscent of ‘cap-andtrade,’ where the global cap on emissions is set by the world’s citizenry. The market for
emission permits is replaced by the requirement (agreed to by the community of
countries) that total emissions do not exceed the ‘supply’ of global emission permits,
which is the simple Kantian equilibrium of the game defined in (3.2).
Skepticism with regard to the proposal may be due, first, to whether the simple
Kantian equilibrium of the game defined is indeed ethically attractive to the participants,
and second, in having confidence that the preferences of countries will properly take
future effects of global emissions into account. However, if countries are not willing to
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take the effects of emissions on future generations into account, there is no satisfactory
solution to the global emissions problem under any procedure.

4. An economy with a private good and a public good

Consider an economy with a private good (x), a public good (y), and labor (E).
Citizens have concave, differentiable utility functions

of the usual kind. There

is a private firm that produces the private good with production function

using labor

as the only input. There is a cooperative firm that produces the public good from labor,
using production function H. The private firm is owned by citizens. Each citizen is
, a positive amount of labor in efficiency units and a share of the

endowed with

private firm. The cooperative firm will be organized along a cooperative principle.
Let

be a supply of labor by agent i to firm 1 (private) and firm 2

(cooperative), respectively. There are n citizens. A feasible allocation satisfies:

Fact.

An interior 6 allocation in the differentiable case is Pareto efficient if and only if:
(A)

, and (B)

,

(4.1)

in addition to the material balance equations.
We define a notion of equilibrium, which is semi-market. The private firm
maximizes profits facing prices for the private good and labor

. Citizens supply

labor to both the private firm and the cooperative firm. Workers are paid wages by the
private firm, but not by the cooperative firm, which operates outside the market. The
vector of labor supplies and demands for the private good are conventional. But the
vector of labor supplies to the cooperative firm must be an additive Kantian equilibrium
of a game to be defined.
6

An interior allocation is one where
is positive for all i and
not necessary that both
be positive for every i.

. It is
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Suppose we are given a vector of labor supplies to the private firm
and private-good consumptions

. Define a game among

the n players with the following payoff functions:
(4.2)
(Recall

.)
We can now define a Walras-Kant equilibrium with a public and private good as
, an allocation of goods

follows. It consists of a price vector
vectors

, n effort

, and a supply of the good and demand for labor by the private firm
such that:

(a) The vector
by

maximizes Firm 1’s profits , i.e.,

. Denote these profits

;

(b) Given

, for each i, the choice

maximizes

over the budget set:
;
, the vector

(c) Given

is an additive Kantian

equilibrium of the game V defined in (4.2) above;
(d) Markets clear:

,

, and in addition

In other words, every worker may participate in both the private and cooperative
economy; his choices in the private economy are optimal for him, given prices, and given
the labor he expends in the cooperative firm and the value of the public good, and the
levels of participation of workers in the cooperative firm form an additive Kantian
equilibrium for them, given the consumption and labor they receive in the private/market
sector. So in the private economy, workers behave as they do under capitalism, but
when producing the public good, they optimize in a cooperative fashion.
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Proposition 4 Any Walras-Kant equilibrium with a public and private good is Pareto
efficient.
Proof:
1. I will assume the equilibrium is interior for simplicity, although the proof extends to
corner solutions.
. By utility maximization over

2. By profit maximization,

easy to check that

where the argument of

is

, it is

. It follows that

condition (A) of the characterization of Pareto efficiency in (4.1) holds.
2. By concavity, the following first-order condition characterizes the additive Kantian
equilibrium of the game V:

for all i,

Expanding this condition we have:
For all i,

.

Using the fact that

(4.3)

, proved in step 2, we can write (4.3) as:
.

Now, since

, by interiority of the equilibrium,

(4.4)
is well-defined and

positive; rewrite equation (4.4) as:
.

(4.5)

Now add condition (4.5) over i, giving condition (B) in (4.1) of Pareto efficiency. 
What happens if we substitute for condition (c), condition (c*):

(c*)

Given

the vector

equilibrium of the game V defined in (2) above.

is a multiplicative Kantian
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We have:
Proposition 5 Any Walras-Kant (multiplicative variant) equilibrium in which for all i
is Pareto efficient.
Proof:
1. Same step 2 in Prop. 4.
2. We now require:
for all i,

or:

,

.
Again, we substitute

for

, giving:

.
Adding over i gives the required condition (B) for Pareto efficiency. 
We have the existence result:

Proposition 6 If G obeys the Inada conditions and is strictly concave, and the utility
functions are strictly concave, then an additive Walras-Kant equilibrium with a public
and private good exists.
See Appendix, Parts A and C.

Remark. The proof of existence of a multiplicative Walras-Kant equilibrium should also
be true, but will be more delicate. This is because the zero vector is always a
multiplicative Kantian equilibrium of the game V, but we want to show the existence of a
Walras-Kant equilibrium where the vector

is strictly positive (or else we lose Pareto

efficiency). Doing this requires cutting out a small piece of the domain
the origin, and then some conditions on the derivatives of

near

are needed to guarantee that

maps this slightly smaller domain into itself. To avoid this complication, I have
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elected to prove existence for the additive Kantian version, which does not suffer from
this problem.

5. A design for market socialism
This model is somewhat more complicated, for it is the only one in which I
assume there are two produced private commodities and labor. I have chosen to
introduce this complication to show that the usefulness of Kantian optimization is not
restricted to economies with a single private commodity.

It will be clear that the

arguments will hold for economies with any number of private, produced commodities.
A. Introduction
Market-socialist models to date have not modeled cooperation or solidarity among
citizens although these features are at the heart of the socialist ideal. Despite the
importance of cooperation to the socialist vision, existing models present no explicit
conception of how people would behave differently (cooperatively) in a socialist society
from how they behave (non-cooperatively) in a capitalist economy. In market-socialist
models heretofore (e.g., Lange and Taylor [1938], Roemer [1994]), agents are presumed
to optimize in the same way that Arrow-Debreu agents optimize, maximizing a selfregarding preference order subject to constraints. One might suppose that socialist
citizens would possess preferences with an altruistic element in them.

However, I have

not seen any market-socialist models with this property – and in any case, if an agent is
small in the economy, it is unclear whether his having a preference order with an
altruistic character would produce equilibria any different from one in which agents are
entirely self-regarding. (See Dufwenberg et al [2011].) After all, if an agent is small,
what difference would his altruistic contribution make, and would this small contribution
outweigh the personal cost he sustains by making it? The preferences of agents are
standard and self-regarding in my proposal.
Income taxation is the redistributive mechanism here. The key observation is that
Kantian (as opposed to Nash) optimization in the labor-supply decision nullifies the usual
deadweight loss incurred with income taxation. Any degree of post-fisc income equality
can be achieved without sacrificing Pareto efficiency. The economic mechanism is
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decentralized, efficient, and as equal as citizens choose it to be, through a presumably
democratic choice of the tax rate.

B. The economic environment
There are two produced private goods and a homogeneous kind of labor,
measured in efficiency units. There are two firms, each of which produces one of the
goods from inputs of labor and capital, using production functions G and H respectively,
which map

. Worker i is endowed with

and receives a profit share
firm

from Firm l , for

, and is endowed with

units of labor in efficiency units,
. The state owns fractions

of

units of the capital good. Good 1 is used both for

consumption and capital, and Good 2 is a pure consumption good. The state uses its
capital to finance investment in the two firms, and the private agents spend their incomes
on consumption of the two goods. Private agent i has preferences over the two
consumption goods and labor expended (in efficiency units) represented by a utility
function

. All activity takes place in a single period.

Firms are traditional – they are price-takers and demand capital and labor and
supply commodities to maximize profits. A linear tax at an exogenous rate

will

be levied on all private incomes, with the tax revenues returned to the population as an
equal demogrant. Given their incomes (which consist of after-tax wages, profit income
and the demogrant) and their labor supply, producer-consumers choose the optimal
commodity bundle in the classical way. However, the determination of labor supply,
and hence of income, is non-traditional – that is to say, the worker does not choose her
labor supply in the Nash manner. A vector of labor supplies must be an additive Kantian
equilibrium of a game to be defined below.

C. The game
Let

be a price vector where

is the price of commodity l, for

w is the wage rate for labor in efficiency units, and r is the interest rate on capital. Let
be a labor supply vector by agent i to Firms 1 and 2. Thus the vector of labors
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supplied to Firm G is

and the vector of labors supplied to Firm H is

. Fix the capital levels
income of private agent i at

,

of the two firms. Define the

under a linear income tax at rate t as:
(5.1)

where the profits of the two firms are defined by:
,
and

(5.2)

is the labor supplied to Firm l. The last term on the r.h.s. of (5.1) is the value of

the demogrant, equal to the per capita share of total tax revenues (where taxes are levied
on all private incomes but not on the state’s income).
The income of the state is:
.

(5.3)

That is, the state receives its share of firms’ profits plus the return on its investment, but
this is not taxed, which explains the specification of the demogrant in equation (5.1).
Now suppose that every (private) agent were to increase her total labor by a constant
, positive or negative. Then i’s hypothetical income would be:

(5.4)

where fraction

of the total increase in labor

is allocated to Firm 1, and fraction

to Firm 2. We need not adopt a rule for how each agent would allocate her
additional labor

between the two firms, as this will turn out not to matter. It is

assumed that workers are price takers: in particular, they take the wage w as given.
A comment on the logic behind equation (5.4) is in order. A Nash player, who
chooses his labor supply while assuming all other labor supplies remain fixed, need not
consider the effect of his labor-supply decision on either the profits of firms in which he
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works or owns equity, or upon the demogrant, if the economy is large. Hence, our
practice in Nash-type analysis is to ignore these effects. But in Kantian optimization, the
counterfactual the worker envisages is that all workers change their labor supplies in the
same amount as the change he is contemplating, and hence consistency in the thought
experiment requires that we alter the labor supplies to firms, and the value of the
demogrant, accordingly. Hence, the formulation of equation (5.4) 7.
At this counterfactual labor supply by worker i,

, given her income as

specified by (5.4) , let the agent compute her commodity demands, which are the solution
of the program:

(5.5)

Denote the solution to this program by

, where I

abbreviate with the notation

.

We now define the payoff functions of a game. The payoff to agent i is his utility
at prices

if the capital invested in the firms is

labor supplies

, and the vector of

were to determine wage income, profit income, and the value

of the demogrant, that is:
.

(5.6)

Incorporated in the payoff function is the assumption that at her personal part of the
community effort vector, agent i has chosen her commodity demands optimally, given the
income generated.
Thus, given a vector of prices

, and the ownership shares of firms, a

game whose strategies are effort/labor supplies is defined, denoted

7

. We can define

Saying that workers are price-takers means they do not contemplate the change in the
wage that would be forthcoming were the aggregate labor supply to change. Strictly
speaking, their taking the wage as fixed must be regarded as an illusion. This contrasts
with price-taking under Nash optimization, which is rational if the economy is large.

22
its additive Kantian equilibrium, which is a vector of labor supplies
satisfying (2.3): that is to say, a vector

such that:

.

D.

(5.7)

Walras-Kant equilibrium market-socialist equilibrium with taxation

The data of the economy are

. It

is useful, for conceptualizing Pareto efficiency, to define the utility function of the state,
which is:
.

(5.8)

That is, the state cares only about Good 1, which it uses for investment.
We now define a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium at tax rate t, to consist of:
i.

a price vector

,

ii.

labor and capital demands by the two firms of

iii.

labor supplies

iv.

for all private agents i, commodity demands

and

, respectively,

by all workers i to Firms 1 and 2,
for the outputs of Firms 1 and

2, resp., and a demand for the first good by the state of

,

such that:
v.

at given prices,

vi.

the labor supply vector

maximizes profits of Firm l, for l = 1, 2,
, where

additive Kantian equilibrium at the given prices of the game

, constitutes an
, as defined in

(5.6),
vii.

maximizes the utility of agent i, given prices, her labor supply, and her
income, given by (5.1),

viii.

maximizes the state’s utility
, and

subject to its budget constraint
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ix.

all markets clear; that is,
, and

,
.

The depreciation rate of capital is set at zero. Thus, at the beginning of the next period
the state’s endowment of the capital good will be

(see eqn. (5.3)).

E. The first theorem of welfare economics for market socialism
The appropriate concept of Pareto efficiency will be called investment constrained
Pareto efficiency (ICPE).

An allocation is ICPE if there is no other feasible allocation

that makes at least one agent better off without harming any agent, where the state is
included as an agent. Since the model is not intertemporal, it is important to qualify the
kind of Pareto efficiency that can be realized: citizens cannot trade off present against
future consumption in the model, and hence we cannot speak of efficiency in the full
sense.

To say this more straightforwardly: the state’s investment is determined by its

endowment of capital, not by any considerations of the population’s future welfare.

We

know that both the Soviet Union and post-1949-China probably invested too much,
committing their populations to excessively low consumption. Such can happen in this
model, too.
It is easy to show that, with differentiability, an interior allocation 8 is ICPE
exactly when:

8

An allocation is called interior if all private agents consume positive amounts of both

commodities and leisure, and all supply positive amounts of labor (but it is not necessary
that any agent supplies labor to both firms).
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(5.9)

where

, etc.
Conditions (a)-(d) specify feasibility; conditions (e)-(g) specify efficiency.

Proposition 7 Assume differentiability of the production functions and the utility
functions. Assume that the production functions are concave and the utility functions are
strictly concave. Let

comprise a Walras-Kant

(additive) equilibrium at any income tax rate

.

Then the induced allocation is

investment-constrained Pareto efficient.
Proof of Proposition 7:
0. Although the theorem’s statement assumes the equilibrium is interior, this is easy to
relax, with a concomitant alteration of the first-order conditions.
1.

At a Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t, profit-maximization gives:
,

and clearing of the capital market tells us that

(5.10)

. Therefore, it follows from

(5.9) that an interior equilibrium is ICPE if and only if:
(5.11)
.
2. Consider the program:
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where E and I are fixed.

Denote the solution

. The f.o.c.s for the

solution of the program are:
(5.12)
By the implicit function theorem, the functions

are differentiable and their

derivatives are given by:
,

(5.13)

,

(5.14)

and

(5.15)

,
where

(5.16)

is the leading principal sub-matrix of order two of the Hessian of the function

, and the superscript
indeed applies because

indicates ‘transpose.’ Note that the implicit function theorem
is negative definite by the strict concavity of

, and so the

denominators of equations (5.13)-(5.16) do not vanish.
4. Now the labor-supply vector is an interior additive Kantian equilibrium of the game
if and only if :

for all

:
.

(5.17)

This statement reduces to:
,

(5.18)

26

where

.

5. From (5.4), calculate that:

(5.19)

Since the four partial derivatives
by profit maximization, and

of the firms’ profit functions are zero,
, (5.19) reduces to:
,

for any t.

(5.20)

It is now evident why we did not have to specify how workers allocate the

increment ρ in labor between the two firms: that allocation does not affect the validity of
(5.20).
We therefore write the condition for Kantian equilibrium of labor supplies,
equation (5.18), as:
.

(5.21)

6. We now expand equation (5.21) by making a sequence of substitutions: (i) substitute
the expressions for the four derivatives of the
(5.16), and (ii) eliminate

via the substitution

and

functions from (5.13) through
, the f.o.c. from (5.12). So

doing reduces (5.21) to:

(5.22)
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where

, which is a negative number.

Finally, divide both sides of equation (5.22) by the positive number

, simplify, and

calculate that that equation reduces to:
,

(5.23)

which is one of the two required efficiency conditions for agent i.
7. Now substitute for

in the last equation using

, yielding:

.

(5.24)

By equations (5.23), (5.24) and (3.2), the proposition is proved. 

The key move in the proof is to show that, regardless of the tax rate, when a worker
thinks of all workers as varying their labor supplies in the amount she is contemplating
varying her own, she internalizes the externality generated by her labor-supply choice – a
choice that affects firm profits and tax revenues. Her own action causes a negligible
change in these magnitudes, but of course the aggregate effect of many small changes is
significant. The additive counterfactual in the universal change in labor supplies and
linear income taxation combine in such a way as to exactly cancel the deadweight loss of
taxation that afflicts Nash optimization in the labor-supply decision. (This is the meaning
of equation (5.20), the key to the proof.) This kind of pairing – associating a specific
cooperative optimization protocol with a particular allocation rule, where the two
together deliver Pareto efficiency – is a feature of Kantian equilibrium in simpler (nonmarket) environments. What’s new here is combining additive Kantian optimization
with markets.
A remark on why the incentive problem, causing deadweight losses in the standard
model, does not bite here. Consider, for dramatic effect, an income tax rate of one, and
suppose every worker is supplying zero labor (as she would in the standard model at this

28
tax rate). But here, by using the Kantian optimization protocol, a worker balances her
share of an increase in income that would occur if all workers increased their labor
supply from zero to some small positive ρ against her (very small) disutility of labor at
zero. The trade-off is usually worth it. Consequently, at the Kantian equilibrium, even
at a tax rate of unity, (most) workers will supply a positive amount of labor.

E. An example of Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium
Because capital allocation is passive in this model, let’s simplify by studying an
economic environment where the capital inputs are fixed, there is no state, and we model
production as a function of labor only:
(5.25)

There are n agents, and the total endowment of labor is
for all
choosing

. We set

.

We let

. We normalize the price vector by

There is no market for capital and hence no interest rate.

An interior allocation is a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium at income tax rate t
when the allocation is Pareto efficient, the income of i is given by (5.1), and markets
clear. (The critical condition that the labor supplies comprise a Kantian equilibrium of
the game

is embedded in the efficiency conditions, as the proof of Proposition 1

shows.) We write these conditions as:

(5.26)

and (5.1) holds for all i.

By (5.26), the post-fisc income of agent i is given by
. Hence, (5.1) can be written:
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.

(5.27)

By adding up the equations over all i in (5.26), we have:
(5.28).
Now using the expressions for commodity prices in (5.26), we write these equations as:
.
System (5.29) comprises two equations in the two unknowns

and

(5.29)
; the solution

. Thus total production at Walras-Kant

must be a vector

equilibrium for this economy, if such exists, is independent of the tax rate t. Profits are
also independent of t. Taxation simply redistributes a fixed output of commodities.
Parameterize the example with
yet specified the individual endowments

,
.

We have not

We solve (5.29):
.

(5.30)

Profits are positive for both firms, and comprise 28% of national income.
To complete the analysis, we must specify the

and solve for

. Rewrite

equation (5.27) as:
.

(5.31)

Examination shows that equation (5.31) possesses an interior solution in which
for all i exactly when:
for all i,

.

If, on the other hand, (5.32) is false for some i, then there is no interior equilibrium.

(5.32)
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It is of interest to compute the lower bound on the labor endowment, call it
will guarantee an interior Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t.

, that

From (5.32) , this

depends upon the tax rate. We compute this lower bound for various tax rates for our
example:

Table.

is the minimum value of

supporting an interior Walras-Kant equilibrium

as a function of the tax rate
Recall that the average labor endowment with our parameterization is

. From

the table, a Walras-Kant (additive) equilibrium exists where all agents work regardless of
the distribution of individual labor endowments, as long as

. But as the tax rate

rises, the restriction on the distribution of labor endowments bites.
For tax rates larger than 40%, equilibrium still exists, but workers who are
insufficiently skilled do not work. We illlustrate with a second paramaterization. The
utility functions and production parameters are as before, but we examine an economy
with two agents (n =2), where

. If both agents work, then

are given by (5.30). Let us look for an equilibrium where

. Both agents must then

have the same after-tax income. Inequality (5.32) is false for agent 1, so there is no
equilibrium at
zero:

where both agents work.

We therefore set agent 2’s labor supply to

. The other equations characterizing a Walras-Kant equilibrium are:
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(5.33)

The two equations in the first line say the marginal rates of substitution for the agent with
positive labor supply equal the correct price ratios; the second line says the marginal rates
of transformation equal the correct price ratios; the third line is true because when the tax
rate is 1, both agents have the same (post-fisc) income, and so consume the two
commodities identically; the fourth line expresses market-clearing for the two
commodities; and the fifth line expresses the efficiency condition for the agent who
supplies zero labor. The solution is given by:
(5.34)

F. Existence of Walras-Kant market socialist equilibrium
We first note:
Proposition 8 Let

be a Walrasian equilibrium at

. (The state is simply another agent who desires to consume only the first good, and
possesses no labor endowment.) Then it is also an additive Walras-Kant market
socialist equilibrium at
Proof:
We know the allocation is ICPE by the usual first welfare theorem for private-ownership
economies.

The income equation (5.1) holds by definition of Walrasian equilibrium.

We need only show that the labor supplies comprise a Kantian equilibrium, which is to
say, that equation (5.21) holds. But we have shown that this is equivalent to the
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efficiency conditions that

. These conditions hold by hypothesis, since the

allocation is Walrasian and therefore Pareto efficient, and the claim is proved.



We assume:
Assumption A
(i)

are unbounded, concave, homothetic, and the Inada conditions hold, and

(ii) all consumer preferences are representable by strictly concave, differentiable
utility functions, and both commodities are normal goods for all consumers.

Proposition 9 Let an economic environment
Assumption A hold. Suppose that

be given and let

for all (private) agents and that

Then a Walras-Kant equilibrium exists for any

.

.

Proof: See Appendix, Parts A and D.
A comment on investment in the model is called for. In the approach I’ve taken,
only the state invests.

Could private agents invest in the firms as well, and preserve the

efficiency result? The answer is yes, if the profile of investments is also an additive
Kantian equilibrium.

I elected not to follow this route here, both for reasons of

simplicity, and because it strikes me as more credible that workers can learn to adopt
Kantian optimization in their labor-supply decisions than in their investment decisions.
Perhaps I am here influenced by the observation that workers have a history of
cooperation, and investors do not, at least to the same extent.

6. An economy with worker-owned firms
Traditionally, worker-owned firms are modeled as having the objective of
maximizing value-added per worker. Here, I propose instead that firms maximize
profits, pay wages to workers, and then profits are divided among workers in proportion
to their labor. There are, however, workers from different occupations, whose labor is
incommensurate, and so one must determine, somehow, what fraction of profits will be
distributed to the set of workers in each occupation.
be specified exogenously.

We will show these fractions can
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There is an economy with one good. There are two kinds of labor – two
occupations. The good is produced by a concave production function

where E

and D are the levels of the two occupational labor supplies. We simplify here by
ignoring the capital input.
There are n citizen-workers, partitioned into two elements:

where

is the endowment of labor the agent has in the E (or D) occupation.
Individuals have utility functions of the form

or

depending

upon the kind of labor they possess.
The economy uses markets, with three prices,

, p being the price of the

good, w the wage of E labor and d the wage of D labor. There is one firm, utilizing the
production function G.

The firm maximizes profits. The profits accrue to workers in

proportion to their labor supplies, as follows. A fraction

of profits will be divided

among the E workers in proportion to their labor contributions, while fraction

of

the profits are divided among the D workers in proportion to their labor contributions.
is an exogenous parameter of the model. Thus, for instance, the income of a worker of
type 1 (that is,

) will be:
,

where

is the firm’s profits, and

(6.1)

. The analogous express holds for

workers of type 2.
Given prices, consider a game
a total labor supply

whose players are the E workers. We are given

by the type-2 workers. The payoff functions for the E-workers

are:

;

(6.2)

34
Analogously, given a total labor supply by the E workers of

, consider a game among

the D workers whose payoff functions are:

.

(6.3)

Definition 6 A Walras-Kant worker-ownership equilibrium with profit-share parameter
is
•

a price vector

•

consumption bundles

•

the vector

for all

and

for all

such that:
solves the firm’s profit maximization problem:

•

given

,

game
•

given
game

is a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium of the
defined in (6.2) for the type 1 workers,

,

is a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium of the
defined in (6.3) for the type 2 workers.

Notice that all markets clear by the definition of equilibrium.
Conceptually, the main difference between this conception of an economy with
worker-owned firms and Drèze’s (1965) model of worker-owned firms is that here,
workers receive a wage and then a share of profits whereas in Drèze’s model, workers do
not receive wages, but divide up value-added net of the cost of capital. In the present
economic environment, since there is no payment to capital, this means that total firm
revenues would be divided up among workers. Drèze also gives weights to the shares
that workers of different occupations receive, but they emerge endogenously, whereas in
my model, the weights (

) are exogenous – a policy variable.
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Proposition 10 Any Walras-Kant worker-ownership equilibrium such that the two
occupational labor vectors are strictly positive is Pareto efficient.
Proof:

1. By profit-maximization, we have:
.
2. The condition that the vector
of the game

(6.4)

be a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium

is:

,
where

(6.5)

is the derivative of the profit function w.r.t. the labor supply of type 1. By
, and so (6.5) reduces to:

profit maximization, at the equilibrium allocation,

;

(6.6)

, we have:

invoking the fact that

for all

.

(6.7)

3. In like manner, we have
for all

.

(6.8)

4. By (6.4),(6.7) and (6.8), the allocation is Pareto efficient. 
Proposition 11 Under standard conditions 9, there exists a WKWO equilibrium for any
.
Proof: See Appendix, Parts A and E.

9

The main assumption that deserves mention is that leisure and consumption are normal
goods for all preference orders.
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Remark.

Society is free to choose the share

occupations, and

. Then there will exist equilibria for any profit-share
in the

vector

. More generally, suppose there are m

unit simplex. For instance, one could choose

as to divide profits equally among all occupations, by letting

so

be proportional to the

number of workers of occupational type j . (Within each occupation, the profits will be
divided in proportion to effort.) Thus, in this economy, we can achieve an approximation
to equality of distribution of capital income.
Of course, we have avoided the question of capital inputs, and so have not had to
worry about paying interest to investors. I do not think there would be any problem
adding capital to the model; however, workers would then have to pay interest to
investors before dividing the remaining profits among themselves.

7. The psychology of Kantian optimization

The differentia specifica of the models here proposed is Kantian optimization in the
labor-supply decision (or in the emissions decision). Having a formal definition of
cooperation is, obviously, a pre-condition to embedding cooperation in equilibrium
models.
It will likely be the case that skepticism regarding my proposal will focus upon the
realism of supposing that a large population of producers can learn to optimize their
labor-supply (or emissions) decisions in the Kantian manner.

There are, I think, three

necessary conditions for the psychological accessibility of such behavior: desire,
understanding, and trust. Citizens/workers must desire to cooperate with each other,
they must view themselves as part of a solidaristic society, whose members believe that
cooperation in economic decisions is the modus operandi. But why should the Kantian
optimization protocol appeal to people as the preferred mode of cooperation? I think the
motivation must be in the conception of fairness or solidarity embodied in the statement,
“I should only reduce (increase) my labor supply if I would like all others to reduce
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(increase) their labor supplies in like manner 10.” Our brains love symmetry, and fairness
always, I believe, involves a conception of symmetrical treatment. Secondly, people
must understand that cooperation in the labor-supply decision internalizes the
externalities that are improperly treated with Nash optimization. That’s what Benjamin
Franklin was appealing to when he uttered his famous phrase about hanging together,
which later became a motivational slogan in the American labor movement. For instance,
in the market-socialist model, each must understand that if all increase their labor supply
by a small increment, each person’s income increases by the wage times that increment,
because what a worker loses in the tax on her wage, she gains back in the increased value
of the demogrant. Thirdly, individuals must trust that others will behave cooperatively as
well, and will not take advantage of their own cooperative behavior, by optimizing in the
Nash manner. If these three conditions are met, then the method of implementing
cooperative behavior is not difficult: for instance, in the market-socialist model, each
worker should choose his labor supply to equalize his marginal rates of substitution
between commodities and labor to his gross real wage, rather than his after-tax wage.
Rather than thinking “Is the disutility of an extra day’s work worth to me the after-tax
wage increment?” the worker should ask whether it is worth the gross wage increment.
If we believe people are capable of optimizing in the Nash manner, optimizing in the
Kantian manner is no more cognitively demanding, if the necessary conditions are met.
To return to my earlier comment, these results suggest that the market (conjoined
with price-taking behavior) is an even more powerful allocation mechanism than standard
theory suggests.

In many cases -- I do not have a complete characterization of them –

inefficiencies of market equilibrium are due not to ‘the market,’ but to the behavioral
protocol of Nash optimization. This is a mathematical claim, based on the efficiency
theorems above, which is true regardless of the realism of Kantian optimization. As I
said, I do not challenge the claim that in truly one-shot games, Nash optimization is
10

But why should workers conceive of symmetric treatment as a translation of the labor
vector rather than a rescaling of it (multiplication by positive constant)? I have no good
answer to this question, except to say that there are examples of it in history. ‘Doing
one’s bit’ in the Second World War in Britain arguably involved a translation of the labor
vector, not a rescaling. Unfortunately, there is no simple income tax function that will
combine with ‘rescaling’ as the Kantian protocol to produce Pareto efficient allocations
with any degree of income equality.
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rational. In games played by members of a society with a common culture, where
members have learned to trust each other, due to a history of repeated interactions
characterized by cooperative behavior, Kantian optimization may, however, become a
moral norm. How that comes to be is another story.
I believe there are many examples in real life of simple Kantian equilibrium:
many people recycle their garbage, even if penalties for failing to do so do not exist;
voting can be viewed as a simple Kantian equilibrium; the British ‘doing their bit’ in the
two world wars is a simple Kantian equilibrium or perhaps an additive Kantian
equilibrium; the degree of tax compliance in most advanced democracies is far greater
than can be rationalized by reasonable risk preferences and existing penalties, and is
perhaps better understood as due to Kantian optimization (I pay taxes because that’s the
action I’d like all to take); participation in labor strikes and demonstrations may be more
convincingly explained as Kantian behavior than Nash behavior ( à la Olson [1965]). I
have discussed these examples in more detail elsewhere (Roemer [in press]). I do not
claim to have airtight proof that people are, indeed, optimizing according to a Kantian
protocol in the above examples (and many others), but observation is consistent with this
explanation.

And let us not belittle the suggestive role of theory: once we have a

precise model of a behavior, we may be stimulated to look for it in history and in the
laboratory, and be surprised at how often it turns up 11.

Appendix: Proofs of existence theorems
A. An important correspondence 12
We will use the correspondence
fact, shown here, that at a fixed point of
Let
Let

11

defined below in a number of proofs, and the
, all markets clear.

be a price simplex of dimension

for an economy with n markets.

be the excess demand function of the economy, which obeys Walras’s

I would be interested in knowing how many economists thought Nash equilibrium was
a crazy idea when Nash first proposed it. As rumor has it, apparently John von Neumann
did.
12
See Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Proposition 17.C.1.
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Law: for all

. Define the correspondence

as follows. On

, define:
.
On

, define:
.
Suppose

is a fixed point of

and the definition of
: for if

. It must lie by definition in

on

tells us that

. Thus

. It follows that

had a negative component, Walras’s Law would be contradicted.

Therefore all markets in the economy clear at

.

B. Essentials of the proof of Proposition 3

1. Let

, the price 2-simplex. By profit maximization, assuming the Inada

conditions hold for the production functions, we have the demands for capital and
emissions in each country,

satisfy

2. The total supply of emissions by the n countries

(8.1)

for all i

This says
where the

must satisfy:

for all i,
sum to one.

Let’s define functions

by the equations:
.

(8.2)
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Obviously

are increasing functions, and since

without bound, there is a unique value

such that

, and the
.

increase

Let

. Thus,

there is unanimity among countries regarding the global supply

at these values of
of emissions.

3. We have now defined the demands and supplies of capital, emissions, and the good at
any interior price vector, and the vector a.

; the

This uses the fact that

Note that Walras’ Law holds:

are defined by

, where

are

the profits of the country i’s firm at the given prices.
Define the excess demand function

=

where

, etc.

4. Construct the correspondence
markets clear. The shares

as in Part A above. At a fixed point of

, all

are given by step 2 above.

5. It is left to verify that the conditions of Kakutani’s FPT hold.

is convex-valued on

and u.h.c. here by the Maximum Theorem. It is obviously convex valued on
and standard argument shows it is u.h.c. here. Thus a fixed point exists.



C. Proof of Proposition 6

1. Denote by

the 1-simplex of prices

.

Define the compact, convex set:

.
We are given

. Define the supply of the private good and the

demand for labor for the G firm by profit-maximization:

,
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.
Denote the profits by
2. Next, define

.
, and define

as the solution of

(8.3)

3. Define:
for all i

.

(8.4)

Note, by the domain over which the maximization occurs,

. By

strict concavity of utility, the solution of (8.4) for a given i is unique.
Now define for all i,

.

4. Note that Walras’ Law holds by adding up the budget constraints:

Denote the excess demand function by:
where
.

Now define

Recall that

depends on

as in Part A above. That is, if

.

define:
.

For

define

.

Define
Finally, define

, which is single-valued.
, noting that

maps

into itself.
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5. Suppose

is a fixed point of

. By Part A above,

Now it also follows from the fixed point property that for all i,

.

. Therefore

is an additive Kantian equilibrium of the game V defined in (4.2). This
shows that the fixed point is a Walras-Kant equilibrium with a public and private good.

6. It is left only to verify that

is upper hemi-continuous and convex-valued. Convex-

valuedness is immediate, as is u.h.c. on

. The u.h.c. of

on

is a standard

argument which we skip. 
D. Proof of a lemma, and then Proposition 9
Let

be the 3-simplex of price vectors

correspondence on the domain

. We define a

. Let Q can be any real number, and

positive continuous functions on

be

. Let:

(8.5)
Now define

by:
,

where

may be positive, zero, or negative. Finally, define:
.

Lemma Let

(8.6)

and

. Let

functions for all i. If Assumption A(ii) holds then
function mapping

(8.7)

be continuous
is a (non-empty) continuous

.

Proof of lemma:
1. It suffices to show that

is single-valued and continuous for any i. By strict

concavity of preferences, the correspondence

is single-valued and continuous on

.
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Suppose that

contains two elements; i.e., there are allocations
for

, with

. It

follows that:
,
where

(8.8)

, etc. Therefore the quantities on the right-hand sides of the two

equations in (8.8) are equal, implying that:
,
and so

(note

(8.9)

by assumption). Therefore :
(8.10)

and so either

. But since

must be that

, it

because both commodities are normal goods, and the

consumer’s wealth (check the definition of
contradiction proves that
2. Next we show

for

) is greater at

than at

. This

contains at most one element.

contains at least one element.

is a planar

lies above (resp. below) the planar segment

segment. We say a point

if it lies in the positive orthant and
).

(resp.,

Note that the points on planar segment

lie entirely below (or, at one point, on) the planar segment

because:
.

It therefore follows that

(8.11)

lies below (or possibly on) the planar segment

. On the other hand, for large values of Q, the points of

must lie entirely above

. Since

is a continuous function of Q, by the

Berge maximum theorem, it follows that there exists at least one value of Q such that
. Thus,

is a well-defined function.
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3. Continuity of

follows from Berge’s maximum theorem. 

Proof of Proposition 9:
0. The theorem is true for
at

by Proposition 8, since a Walrasian equilibrium exists

under the stated premises. Henceforth, we assume

1. Let

.

be the 3-simplex of prices. Given a price vector

define

to be the solution of:

(8.12)

Note that, by Assumption A(i) the solution exists and satisfies:
.
2. The profits of the two firms and the value of the demogrant are defined at
. Profits are positive for any price vector

.

We now consider the budget constraints of individuals:
(8.13)

and the budget constraint of the state at the firms’ demands:
.
Let

(8.14)

equal the sum of the last two terms on the r.h.s. of equation (8.13). By the

theorem’s premise, all private agents have positive income at any

,

because the state does not receive all the firms’ profits by assumption, and the tax rate is
positive.

are positive continuous functions, and so the premises of the Lemma

hold; therefore the functions
Henceforth, we write

are defined and continuous.
. Let

4. Define the excess demand functions at a vector

for

.
:
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.

(8.15)

Define the excess demand function for the economy by:
.
Next, define the correspondence
6.

on

(8.16)

as in Part A above.

By summing the budget constraints in (8.13) and (8.14) we calculate Walras’s

Law for this economy, defined on

:
.

7. At a fixed point p of

, by Part A above,

(8.17)

. Consequently

, and all markets clear. We deduce
from the premise that

.

8. Associated with these prices is an allocation
. We must show that

, with

for all

is an additive Kantian equilibrium at prices p.

This follows immediately from the definition of the functions

, because the first-order

conditions for Kantian equilibrium, which were derived in steps 4,5,6, and 7 of the proof
of Proposition 7, follow from the definition of

, given that

.
9. Thus, a fixed point of

is a Walras-Kant equilibrium at tax rate t. To show the

existence of a fixed point, we need to check that the premises of Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem hold.
in

is obviously convex-valued. Upper-hemi-continuity of

at any point

follows quickly.
Finally, we examine u.h.c. of

Suppose

. Suppose the sign pattern of

have
away from zero, and

at points on the boundary of the simplex.

.
.

Eventually

is (+,+,0,+). We

are positive and bounded
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We must show that
assume that

. Without loss of generality, we may

for all j. Denote the excess demands at

by

. We will show that, for j sufficiently large
,

(8.18)

and this will imply that, for sufficiently large j,
, for

we will show that
We show that

.

To show (8.18),

.
. We know

, because

, and so the

firms will demand unbounded amounts of labor, while the supply of labor is bounded. If
were bounded above, we would be done. So we suppose that

is

unbounded. It follows that for at least one firm – say the G firm -. But by profit maximization,
homotheticity of G (Assumption A(i)), the points
any ray in the positive quadrant of

. By
must eventually lie below

space. This implies that

, as

required.
To show

for

, it suffices to show

because the

demand for the two commodities cannot grow faster than total profits (wage income goes
to zero). We show

. Let j be large and

. Then:
,(8.19)

by concavity of G, where

, etc., and so:

.

(8.20)
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Now let

, but j more slowly than J. We know from above that
, and

, and

. Therefore the right-

hand side of (8.20) approaches zero, and so

, as was to be proved.

We examine one more case on the boundary of the simplex. Suppose the sign
pattern of

is (0,+,0,+). Then
and eventually

.

We know that

are bounded away from zero. If eventually
, then eventually

is greater than

.

Firm 2 eventually demands huge amounts of labor, because the wage goes to zero but the
price of output is significantly positive. The profits of Firm 1 go to zero since
These facts imply that

.

and so, as in the first case examined above,

dominates the other excess demands, as required.
The other cases of points on

yield to similar analysis. Hence, the premises of

Kakutani’s theorem hold, and a fixed point in

, which is a Walras-Kant market

socialist equilibrium, exists. 
E. Essentials of proof of Proposition 11

1. Let

be the 2-simplex. Let

. Let

be the profit

maximizing supply of output, demand for labor of occupation 1 and demand for labor of
occupation 2 by the firm. This exists and is unique if G is strictly concave, differentiable,
and satisfies the Inada conditions, since the f.o.c.s are then:
.
2. Given B, we show the existence of a unique vector
(i) for each

,

. and

such that:
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(ii) for each

,

.

It is easiest to see this claim is if we define worker i’s utility function over consumption
and leisure (measured in efficiency units):
.
. (i) and (ii) above now become:

Write
(i’)

and (ii’)

.
described by (i’) is an expansion path for the utility function

The locus of points

in the non-negative quadrant of the

plane, and the locus of points

described by (ii’) intersects the positive quadrant of that plane in a non-empty straightline segment of negative slope. The intersection of these two loci exists and is a unique
point if consumption and leisure are both normal goods, for this guarantees that the
expansion path begins at the origin, is a monotone increasing path, and eventually lies
entirely above the line segment of (ii’), so it intersects that line segment in a single point.
Hence the point defined by (i) and (ii) exists and is unique.

3. In like manner, given A, there exists a unique vector
(i) for each

(ii)

for each

,

such that:

. and

,

.

4. We now define an excess demand function for this economy on

. Denote:
,

where

(8.21)

are the quantities defined in steps 2 and 3.
Define the excess demand function on

:
(8.22)

6. The reader may now verify that Walras’s Law holds:
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.

(8.23)

7. We note that z is single-valued. From here on, we proceed as in earlier sections.
as in Part A above.

Define the correspondence
8. If

is a fixed point of

then

. All three markets clear at

. It is left

only to observe that the conditions (i) and (ii) in steps 2 and 3, which define the supplies
of the two occupational labor vectors, and the demand for the consumption good, exactly
characterize what it means for those vectors to be multiplicative Kantian equilibria of the
games

. This is true, because condition (i) is the f.o.c. for the vector E being

a multiplicative Kantian equilibrium of the game
constraint of the worker (and likewise for the game

, and condition (ii) is the budget
).

This shows that the

allocation is indeed a WKWO equilibrium and p* is an equilibrium price vector.

9. It is left to verify the premises of the Kakutani theorem for

. On

, upper-

hemi continuity follows from Berge’s maximum theorem. The correspondence is singlevalued on the interior, so it is convex valued. We skip the verification of these properties
on the boundary of the simplex. 
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